The Economics of Antitrust Injury and Firm-specific Damages

The Economics of Antitrust Injury and Firm-specific Damages

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The focus of this text is to teach and illustrate the fundamentals of microeconomics as it relates to the administration and enforcement of antitrust laws both domestically and internationally. The chapters instruct as to the fundamentaleconomic constructs relevant to the analysis of antitrust injury, as well as address both legal and economic issues with respect to the measurement of antitrust damages. Each chapter provides the student, practitioner, consultant and/or judicial officer critical insight with respect to the analysis and measurement of competitive injury and any resulting business damages. This book is designed to serve as 1) a companion text in any antitrust law class; 2) a supplemental text in any managerial economics class; and 3) a resource to practitioners and consultants in the field of antitrust and industrial organization.The study of antitrust law is an interdisciplinary endeavor. While the traditional case method approach provides a solid introductory foundation, such an approach, absent any applied economic theory, will likely result in a stale, task-oriented classroom and/or jurisprudential environment, primarily devoted to categorizing an evolving common law history. Given the arbitrarily imposed time constraints imposed by an institutional semester or an administrative judge, one cannot expect to teach or learn all the intricacies of microeconomics, but since an understanding of microeconomics fundamentals will result from an understanding of the underlying assumptions of the model of perfect competition, one can expect to achieve a certain level of competence in their application.Each of the contributing authors is recognized for his or her scholarship and expertise in the antitrust regulatory field. The totality of their varied backgrounds and experiences not only illustrates the robust nature of the book's contents, but also illustrates the profound interdisciplinary nature of regulating competition in the markets of the world.Nata#39;l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 668-70 (1974) (arguing that Exxon-funded studies of punitive damages are legitimate, but should be scrutinized). In United States v. ... Of course, the Court did not always follow this approacha€”as Schwinn illustrates.

Title:The Economics of Antitrust Injury and Firm-specific Damages
Author:Kevin Scott Marshall, Stephen H. Kalos
Publisher:Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company - 2008


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