This book examines North Koreaas nuclear diplomacy over a long time period from the early 1960s, setting its dangerous brinkmanship in the wider context of North Koreaas military and diplomatic campaigns to achieve its political goals. It argues that the last four decades of military adventurism demonstrates Pyongyangas consistent, calculated use of military tools to advance strategic objectives vis An vis its adversaries. It shows how recent behavior of the North Korean government is entirely consistent with its behavior over this longer period: the North Korean governmentas conduct (rather than being haphazard or reactive) is rational a in the Clausewitzian sense of being ready to use force as an extension of diplomacy by other means. The book goes on to demonstrate that North Koreaas qcalculated adventurismq has come full circle: what we are seeing now is a modified repetition of earlier events a such as the Pueblo incident of 1968 and the nuclear and missile diplomacy of the 1990s. Using extensive interviews in the United States and South Korea, including those with defected North Korean government officials, alongside newly declassified first-hand material from U.S., South Korean, and former Communist-bloc archives, the book argues that whilst North Koreaas military-diplomatic campaigns have intensified, its policy objectives have become more conservative and are aimed at regime survival, normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, and obtaining economic aid.On August 26, KPA guards dragged a UNC Security Officer off a UNC jeep and attacked him near KPA Guard Post No. ... of such incidents.17 Violations of the command relationship continued after the December 2 incident, nevertheless.
|Title||:||North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns,, 1966-2008|
|Publisher||:||Routledge - 2009-10-16|