In Honor, History, and Relationship Stephen Darwall explores the idea of a second-personal framework for morality and its foundations, in which we are committed to morality by presuppositions that are inescapable when we relate to others (person to person). He expands on the argument set forth in The Second-Person Standpoint to explore the second-personal framework in three further settings. The first concerns a fundamental differencebetween the form that respect and the concept of person take in honor cultures, on the one hand, and the shape these assume in morality conceived as equal accountability, on the other. The second concerns the role of second-personal ideas in the development of a distinctively qmodernq moral philosophy, beginning inseventeenth-century Europe. The third group of essays treats the second-personal structure of interpersonal relations.Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II Stephen Darwall. As will become clearer in the second Critique, the feeling of respect (reverentia) for the moral law is the phenomenal or felt aspect of respect for law, considered ... essay. Any respect for a person is properly only respect for the law . . . of which he gives us an example.
|Title||:||Honor, History, and Relationship|
|Publisher||:||Oxford University Press - 2013-09|