This thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay, we analyze a two-stage game, with coalition formation in the first stage and Cournot oligopoly in the second, to show how coalition formation takes place and affects the environmental level. In open membership games with symmetric players, the coalition formation process fails, so that the players act independently. In coalition unanimity games with symmetric players, the resulting coalition is the grand coalition, which maximizes the environmental level and improves social welfare compared to the case with open membership. In games with asymmetric players, we analyze coalition formation with and without an endogenous transfer scheme. In the game with a transfer scheme we show that it is possible to achieve a larger coalition than in the game without transfers. For a simple case we explicitly characterize the transfers and their effects on the coalition size.One of the biggest greenhouse gas emitting countries, the United States has not ratified the Protocol.2 The problem has the following features. The first one is externalities. An environmental agreement requires its members to reduce pollutionanbsp;...
|Title||:||Essays on the Theory of Environmental Coalitions|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2007|