Chapter 1. (Bounds on the Counterfactual Revenue Distributions in Auctions with Reserve Prices) In first-price auctions with interdependent bidder values, the distributions of private signals and values cannot be uniquely recovered from bids in Bayesian Nash equilibria. Non-identification invalidates structural analyses that rely on exact identification of the model primitives. In this paper I introduce tight, informative bounds on the distribution of revenues in counterfactual first- and second-price auctions with binding reserve prices. These robust bounds are identified from distributions of equilibrium bids in first-price auctions under minimal restrictions where I allow for affiliated signals and both private- and common-value paradigms. The bounds can be used to compare auction formats and to select optimal reserve prices. I propose consistent nonparametric estimators of the bounds. I extend the approach to account for observed heterogeneity across auctions, as well as endogenous participation due to binding reserve prices. I use a recent data of 6, 721 first-price auctions of U.S. municipal bonds to estimate bounds on counterfactual revenue distributions. I then bound optimal reserve prices for sellers with various risk attitudes.... of Auction Revenue Rankings: the Case of Municipal Bonds, aquot; Rand Journal of Economics, Forthcoming  Temel, J. (2001), The Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds, 5th Edition, Wiley Finance APPENDIX Appendices for Chapter 1-3 1.
|Title||:||Essays in Empirical Auctions and Partially Identified Econometric Models|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|