Based on a non-consequentialist ethical theory, this book critically examines the prevalent view that if a fetus has the moral standing of a person, it has a right to life and abortion is impermissible. Most discussion of abortion has assumed that this view is correct, and so has focused on the question of the personhood of the fetus. Kamm begins by considering in detail the permissibility of killing in non-abortion cases which are similar to abortion cases. She goes on to consider the case for the permissibility of abortion in many types of pregnancies, including ones resulting from rape, voluntary pregnancy, and pregnancy resulting from a voluntary sex act, even if the fetus is considered a person. This argument emerges as part of a broader theory of creating new people responsibly. Kamm explores the implications of this argument for informed consent to abortion; responsibilities in pregnancy that is not aborted, and the significance of extra-uterine gestation devices for the permissibility of abortion.In any case, I am not relying on such an equality argument in constructing the cutoff abortion argument. Indeed, I believe that we may want to question the equality argument on three points: (1) It may be wrong if it suggests that abortion wouldanbsp;...
|Title||:||Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy|
|Author||:||F. M. Kamm|
|Publisher||:||Oxford University Press - 1992-06-11|