In the personal identity literature it is held that a later person remains responsible for an earlier action if and only if that person is identical to the one who was originally responsible for that action. In this dissertation, this is the claim that I will challenge. I will argue that a person may be responsible for an action even if they are different from the person who performed it. In other words, the thesis I will try to defend is that conditions of personal identity over time do not coincide with conditions of responsibility over time. I will argue that given that a being is a person who committed an act and was responsible at the time, that being will remain responsible for that act as long as that being remains a person. I will start off by presenting the different conditions of personhood, and then propose the outlines of a view of moral responsibility. I will discuss conditions of personal identity over time as well as conditions of moral responsibility over time. I hope to show that they are not equivalent, and bring up cases where a later person is responsible for an act of a different (earlier) person. I will turn to cases from psychology of Multiple Personality Disorder and discuss synchronic multiple personhood and moral responsibility in these cases. I will look at especially puzzling examples that might cause problems for my account and deal with other possible problems and objections to this account.Most importantly, I would like to thank Muhammad Ali Khalidi for encouraging me to go to graduate school in the first place ... I would also like to thank Saleh Agha for getting me interested in philosophy in general, and the issue of personalanbsp;...
|Title||:||An Essay on Personal Identity and Responsibility|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|